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Ulasan buku mengenai Khalid Al Walid, Pedang Allah
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Buku ni mmg patut dibaca oleh setiap muslimin yg meminati bidang pertahanan.
Ini kerana buku ini bukan ditulis oleh seorg ustaz atau ulama yg tak berkemahiran perang, atau seorg 'arm-chair general' (org biasa berlagak pandai soal militer), tp oleh Allahyarham Leftenan Jeneral Agha Ibrahim Akram, yg pernah berkhidmat dgn Tentera Pakistan dlm pelbagai konflik.
Beliau mengambil byk masa membuat penyelidikan bkn shj menerusi karya2 ilmiah sejarah Islam yg ditulis sejarawan Islam & Barat, malah melakukan kajian lapangan dgn melawat tempat2 bersejarah yg mana berlakunya peristiwa kempen2 militeri Khalid Al Walid.
Berdasarkan pengalaman militerinya sendiri, penulis telah berjaya merekonstruksi kempen militeri Khalid berdasar fakta & pandangan ketenteraan. |
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Berikut adalah temubual bersama Leftenan Jeneral AI Akram pada tahun 1987. Beliau telah memberi pandangan & komentar berhubung hubungan geopolitik / ketenteraan Pakistan dan India di ambang India mula mengutarakan hasrat menguji bom nuklear.
Link berkenaan: http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalo ... 840789f0dce5e5af682 |
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Pengenalan:
Agha Ibrahim Akram was a lieutenant general who served in the Pakistan Army during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. The interview Akram conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age concentrates on the history of tension and conflict between Pakistan and India. He reviews the three wars: the devastating bloodshed that followed partition in 1947, the pride he felt in 1965 as chief of staff of an infantry division along the West Pakistan border, and his bitterness toward India over the Bangladesh war in 1971. Despite the persistence of tension between Pakistan and India, Akram recognizes circumstances in which their perspectives and geopolitical positions meet. For instance, he fully supports India’s critique of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: that the major nuclear powers only selectively enforce and adhere to its provisions. He wishes that South Asia could be a nuclear-weapons-free zone but is willing to settle for India and Pakistan’s interdependence: “The two countries—we are the protagonists of South Asia. We’ll actually cross the threshold together or not cross it at all.” Akram also recalls 1974 as the watershed year when India detonated a nuclear explosive and took one step toward becoming a nuclear power in hopes of enhancing its global status. That moment also coincided with skyrocketing oil prices, which stiffened Pakistan’s resolve to develop nuclear energy for electricity and, if need be, weapons. |
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 1A:
Indo-Pakistani wars
Interviewer: I'd first like to ask you to give me some feel for the 1965 period in Pakistan, the period of the 1965 war, being a military officer.
Akram: Well at that time in the '65 war I was Chief of Staff of a division at the front in that war and we thought of it as a rather fine war in that we took on --
Interviewer: Let me ask you about the 1965 war and your role in that war.
Akram: Well... We thought of it as rather a fine war. At the time I was the Chief of Staff of an infantry division near the front. And we were rather proud that we had taken on the biggest military power in South Asia in our region. And at that time we thought we'd won the war. And later on we thought -- we discovered India thought just the same, that they had won the war. It was a drawn war but there was a feeling of, of elation that we had fought India in a war and held our own and done as much damage as we had received. The war was ostensively over Kashmir but actually the, the, the problem of India and Pakistan is more than Kashmir. Kashmir is just a symptom of a deeper disease. The actual trouble is a conflict of role consciousness. The two nations have a role consciousness which clashes. The Indian have a feeling that they want to be a world power, that they were, they were destined to become a world power eventually uh, as being a power as the present five -- nuclear weapons and all. We came into being in '47 as the largest Muslim state in this century and we thought we were the, the leaders of the Muslim world. And we were not going to accept uh, hegemony, uh hegemonic policy on the part of India or any kind of domination. We said, "No. We and India are equal." Although we were not equal. We were smaller but we insisted we were equal and we wouldn't accept an Indian big power role. This put the two countries on a collision course and the collided again and again. They are still colliding. The basic thing is a clash of national aims and the methods used by India to achieve those aims which we think are strong-arm methods, not gentle methods. Kashmir is one symptom of their disease. It is not a cause. But in '65 we were still learning a lot about this. And we are very proud of what we had achieved. Our troops had fought magnificently. We'd taken on a military power much bigger than our own and had the war ending in a draw and I think it was quite an achievement for us. So much for '65.
Interviewer: At the time the non-proliferation treaty debate was going on in New York and in Geneva. What was Pakistan's role in that and what was its final conclusion?
Akram: We -- I don't think it became to a very clear cut policy on the NPT for some years because we're not quite sure of its implications for Pakistan. We became more conscious of the NPT in 1974 to which we'll come again a little later but basically I don't think we had given very much thought to the NPT, its implications, its pros and cons in Pakistan. We were actually -- didn't know enough about the consequences of the NPT to take a very firm decision. We took it later on in '74 when India had the explosion but we'll come to that a little later.
Interviewer: Do you want to say the main reasons for Pakistan not signing? If you could just encapsulate this.
Akram: Well basically our main... One main reason for not signing was that India did not sign it. If India were to sign it we would. We would now offer to India that if they will sign it we will. We've said let's jointly sign the NPT. We've even said let's have a special South Asian NPT. If you don't like the idea of signing the NPT because you don't agree with the American policies or British policies. Let's have a South Asian NPT. We didn't sign it because India did not sign it. We were not going to accept a position in which India was free to go ahead to make advances in the direction of nuclear weapons while we should be, while we should be bound by the terms of the NPT not to carry out even research. The main reason was India didn't sign it so we would not sign it either.
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 1B:
Interviewer: Let's talk about the period of 1971 and the political instability of that period and your role.
Akram: Well in '71 I was a divisional commander in uh, what was then West Pakistan at the front. Uh, precisely what we did in, in the divisional front or what we did not do I'm not in a position to say. I'd rather not say it. But generally it was a tragic war in that we were caught by historical forces in 1971 over which we had no control. There was a feeling of separation in East Pakistan, a feeling of alienation which had to come somehow. It wasn't caused by us. It had to come. And there was the tremendous propaganda campaign orchestrated by Indira Gandhi, specifically by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and by her cohorts in the Indian government to portray Pakistan as a cruel colonizing power and the poor East Pakistanis as a colonized people. And so the whole thing was built up as a great propaganda campaign. And eventually it led to the war of 1971 which we fought at tremendous disadvantage.
Interviewer: Can you tell me about the atmosphere in Pakistan in 1971?
Akram: Uh, yes. Now '71 was a rather tragic year for Pakistan. It was a traumatic experience because of the war which cut away a part of Pakistan from us. I was then a divisional commander at the front in West Pakistan. And somehow in that war we had -- we lost on all counts. We lost also in the, on the field of world opinion. Because somehow our enemies built up a propaganda campaign against us to portray us as a brutal colonizing power of West Pakistanis, ill-treating the poor East Pakistanis which was totally false, totally incorrect. And world opinion was built up against us. In spite of that the American government under President Nixon remained in favor of a peaceful solution. And he thought he had found it. But in spite of having given assurances to President Nixon that India would not invade East Pakistan, Indira Gandhi did. And we fought under circumstances in the eastern wing which were totally unfavorable. A small force without supplies, without logistical help, without air power, without ammunition, without armor. And further, worse possible conditions to fight in. And we lost the war partly because the Indian army was superior by about three to one and partly there was a strong element of what they call liberation forces in East Pakistan fighting against the army. What actually happened in, in consequence was that a part of Pakistan was cut away by the Indian armed forces, just as East Germany was cut away by the Soviet army, the by the Red army in 1945. And a new state was born. As it happens today the Bangladeshi is much more friendly to us than they have been for a long time and much more hostile towards India than he has been for a long time. So somehow it didn't help very much doing that, didn't help India. What did happen was that [Chuanlai] at the end of that war and [Chuanlai] was a great man -- and when East Pakistan fell he said, "India's problems have not ended. They have just begun." And I think he was right. Somehow it meant that South Asian states could be broken up and could go from one state into two states. So it was a traumatic experience but we've got over that. We've lived through it. And we have regained our balance now.
Interviewer: How was Pakistan's security perceptions altered by that 1971 war?
Akram: In a way it was an eye opener in that we had some childish ideas that whenever we fight India we'll have the Americans or the Chinese running up to help us to fight for us. We then realized that nobody would come to fight for us. We'd get help in the way of political support, psychological support, propaganda and all the rest of it, political pressures -- but nobody would fight for us. Until then we had this childish idea that because of an alliance with the Americans and because of close relations with the Chinese we'll expect them to cross the borders and fight the Indians. We realized that was silly and a big change we took place for that we said we'll stand on our own feet. It led to a more realistic assessment of what an alliance with the Americans or the Chinese meant. It meant that we'll work together as partners because we have a shared threat perception but we will not actually go into battle to fight the other one's battle. This was one big difference. The other was it confirmed to us that if we had an enemy it was India. There may have been people who argue that with India you can have good relations and they may have been right but after '71 it was clear to us that India was a principal enemy and that unless there is a change in global, in the global situation or geopolitics, the Soviet Union remains allied with India and would not come to our help in any way. In '65 they had acted in a neutral way in the Tashkent Conference. Kosygin came and helped us come together. We now knew that the Soviet Union was fully committed to India. And in case of any further trouble between India and Pakistan we would expect the Soviets to be entirely on the side of the Indians. Those were the major changes in our threat perception.
Interviewer: What were the repercussions for your defense policy as a result of this?
Akram: Well it left us in the doldrums for a couple of years. We were still trying to find our feet. It was the end of martial law and the rise of a democratic system with Prime Minister Bhutto. And for some time we were still rather dazed that the whole thing had happened. You don't lose part of your country just like that so it was -- the effect of that, uh, the trauma lasted for about two years. And that was about the time that our prisoners were kept by the Indians. They didn't send back the prisoners. They kept them back I think in the hope of getting concessions out of us. But in this respect the Pakistan government stood firm and said no concessions. You send back those prisoners. And the prisoners eventually came back after about two years in Indian custody. But the main, the main difference in the policy which took place was a feeling that we have to be more self-reliant to defend ourselves against the principal enemy. And the principal enemy continues to be India. But beyond that there was no major significant change. Not until the coming of the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion which we'll handle separately.
Interviewer: How did this manifest itself in terms of your conventional forces or any decisions at that point about your nuclear policy?
Akram: No. I think the nuclear thing did not come into it at all. Conventionally it was felt that we have to rebuild our forces. Uh, while in India they thought that Pakistan would rebuild to take revenge for East Pakistan. Here the feeling wasn't that. The feeling was that we have been let down by even the East Pakistanis who sided with the Indians. And the Indians, they have pulled off a marvelous coup. They would have handled it. But basically there wasn't any major change except the feeling that we had to work very hard to strenghten Pakistan's defense and to make sure that India does not do this again to Pakistan.
Interviewer: At the same time there was the Afghan coup. How did that affect your security interests?
Akram: Frankly I don't think the Afghan coup had any effect on Pakistan at all. We knew of King Zahir Shah as a sympathetic man. In that, whenever we fought India it doesn't belong to us. That while they have differences with us on certain matters -- as far as our wars with India are concerned the Afghans will not interfere. In fact he gave us a, a very clear undertaking. "If you want to fight Indians, go ahead. You'll have no trouble from us." But with the change and when Daoud Khan took over we were not quite sure that the same policy would continue as existed in the time of King Zahir Shah. Beyond that I don't think we paid much attention to what happened in Afghanistan. It didn't really concern us. And we thought there wouldn't be any major s . .. uh, significant change in relations. |
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 2A:
The Arms Dynamic in Regional Politics
Interviewer: What was your personal reaction to the news that the Indians had exploded a peaceful nuclear device?
Akram: My reaction personally was the same as the national reaction. I think all Pakistanis talked alike on this issue that India has stolen a march and there's a positive danger of the Indians eventually becoming a nuclear power. We could see the euphoria in India. The Indians went mad with joy. "Wonderful! We made -- we had a nuclear explosion. We're entering the nuclear club." Indira Gandhi was regarded as a Devi, as a goddess. She had done it. Wasn't that marvelous? And of course her whole idea was to get political advantage. But the feeling here was there's no such thing as a peaceful nuclear explosion. This is the first step that India has taken towards becoming a nuclear power and we have to do something about it, to have the capability of responding. Then '74 -- we had never thought much of nuclear matters except as uh, generating electricity in Karachi or places like that, purely for some peaceful uses and so on. We never thought of it as an important factor of strategic implication in South Asia. After the '74 explosion at Pokhran in India. We suddenly realized that warfare from now on might not be as simple and as, as a gentlemen's war as in the past. It had been a gentlemen's war with India and Pakistan. We suddenly realized that there was a nuclear angle to it too. And the feeling was that it'll never be the same again, that we don't want to make the bomb but we have to have the capability of responding to India. But with this was a strong link and that was the Yom Kippur war of '73. Because of it the oil prices shot up and in '74 the effect of that was felt at almost the same time as the explosion, that we suddenly found that more than half our foreign exchange earnings were being spent in importing petroleum. It wasn't so before that but with the rise in Pak... the explosion of oil prices we suddenly realized that we had to have other forms of energy. So the requirement of nuclear energy for electricity, for power and the danger of the... or the threat from India who had just exploded the, the nuclear device combined together to, to, to make us, make us feel, to make us feel determined that we must go ahead and have a sizable nuclear program for the production of energy, basically for energy but which might have the capability of stopping India also from going nuclear. '74 was a watershed. It brought the shadow of the bomb to South Asia and that shadow is still there.
Becoming a non-aligned country and developing a nuclear capability
Interviewer: How could your capability to have nuclear facilities threaten India? How could that make India stop?
Akram: I was going to come to that toward the end.
Interviewer: Why did Pakistan decide to become a non-aligned nation in 1979? What's the background to that?
Akram: I think one reason for that was that public opinion seemed to rather favor it. Public opinion felt that why are we committing ourselves to having a -- to being member of a defense pact like SEATO or like CENTO. The public opinion was generally in favor of this. Another factor was that there was a enormous amount of propaganda against us by India because of our connections with Santo. We were shown to the world as an aligned nations and under pressure from Russian, from everyone. And we felt that being a member of a pact did not actually strengthen us to the extent that we would wish to be strengthened. Our mutual security arrangement with the Americans was still in tact. And that's all we needed to get the weapons that were required to strengthen our defense. And that being a member of a thing like, like CENTO which was Baghdad pact at one time, did not materially strengthen our position. And with public opinion going against us we thought let's become non-aligned.
Interviewer: How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan affect Pakistan's security concerns?
Akram: It affected it very seriously because the Soviets before that invasion had not appeared to us as a direct threat, as an enemy. We knew they were a friend of India but that's something different. They didn't appear to us as a direct threat. But when they came into Afghanistan and there was a spillover effect on Pakistan, the refugees coming in and the occasional shelling and bombing, we began to see the Soviets as a potential adversary, that they are possibly an enemy. So there was a change. And there was -- it was only because of Afghanistan that we began to think of the Russians as a potential enemy. We did not think so before that. We will not think so after Afghanistan is settled. But their presence here created this threat to us. What is more the military man's nightmares of a two-front, a two-front war suddenly became real; that there was India on this side and there were the Afghan and Soviet forces on this side. And so in case we were involved in another war, it could be a two-front war which is a nightmare for any General. As we became conscious of the danger to us of a two-front operation because of the presence of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And since then we have thought of the Russians as potential enemies, but in the long term also as potential friends. And once the Afghanistan question is settled, I have no doubt our relations with the Soviets will improve a great deal.
Interviewer: What steps did you take to deal with those threats?
Akram: Well... we did nothing ourselves, we just sort of clenched our teeth. Well if it's going to come we'll fight to the last man. No one's going to ever walk over in Pakistan. We'll do that. Our view is if somebody wants a fight, you can have it whenever you want it. A lot of blood will be shed. We're not giving up a part of our territory. This is one reason why we fought in, in East Pakistan -- although the public had turned against us so that the enemies of Pakistan will know that we're not giving up any part of territory without a great deal of blood being shed. So we said, "Let's prepare for war. If it comes we'll fight to the last man if we have to. Beyond that nothing more." Our plans were adjusted I suppose to deal with the possible invasion from the Northwest also because the presence of the Soviets suddenly created -- altered the picture as a whole and there was a danger. Depending on Soviet intentions. Did they want to go to the Arabian coast? Were they aiming at the Gulf? These were matters of conjecture as to what was the basic aim of the Soviets coming there. But we recast our plans to be prepared for a war on two fronts and to fight even harder than the past.
Interviewer: What efforts were made to strenghten ties with the People's Republic as a result of this?
Akram: I wouldn't say we made efforts to strengthen ties because they were very strong anyway. Our ties with China have really been a kind of fairy tale relationship, which is unusual in the world today. We've been close to them ever since the early sixties. It near started off as an enemy of the enemy relationship because of India being a common adversary to both. But we've gone beyond that enemy of the enemy stage and the two countries really have come very close to each other. Now in the sixties the whole world turned against China. They withdrew their mission from parts of Asia, from Africa, everywhere. The whole world. It was a bad period when they were having the cultural revolution and really became unpopular. Pakistan stood by China. In spite of pressures from the Johnson administration to reduce our alliance on China, to stop being friends we said, "No. We'll remain friends of China." And we never faltered in our, in our fidelity and our faithfulness as a friend. The Chinese know that. And when we have been in need the Chinese have been the first people to stand by us. And both sides know that we have been extremely faithful friends and this continues. It continued even after '74. The perceptions were the same, that China saw India as a possible rival to greatness and as a tool of Soviet encirclement. The Chinese always talk of encirclement. For some reason they're always worried about encirclement. And they thought of China as a proxy of the Soviet Union for the encirclement of China. They think of India as, as a proxy. And so the Chinese thought that we are good people to be friends of China. And this also -- the geopolitical alignment of the various powers in the region has also helped in keeping China and Pakistan close to each other in a beautiful relationship. |
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 2B:
Interviewer: I want to ask you about NPT. Do you think NPT has been a successful non-proliferation measure?
Akram: Uh, no I don't. And while I disagree with a lot of things which the Indians do in relation to power politics and military strength -- in this I agree with them; that in some way the NPT has only strengthened the powers which have nuclear power already and weakened the powers who don't have it. And they're the Third World mainly. That in a way, not directly but indirectly it becomes a device to deny nuclear technology for peaceful and developmental purposes to the poorer nations which need them. And I think there is a lot in this. The NPT not only prevents other countries from going to nuclear weapons, it also demands of the nulcear powers to cut down their own stockpile. And instead of doing that they've built up a stockpile. They've gotten even more into it. So the NPT has been in some ways unfair to the Third World and it has been hypocritical in that those people who have nuclear weapons have done nothing to implement that part of the treaty which required them to cut down on nuclear weapons. My own view is that actually the NPT cannot stop anyone from going nuclear. It is known that Israel, Israel has the bomb. It's known to everybody. The CIA has said it. Everybody has said it. There's no pressure on Israel to sign the NPT. But the pressure put on India and Pakistan to sign the NPT -- we think of this as hypocracy. It is not fair. So the NPT is seen by us as a move to deny nuclear technology to countries which might need it. If the NPT were better worded, if it were more just, if it imposed restrictions on the big powers as much as it does on the smaller ones it would be a good treaty. But at the moment it is directed and applied mainly against the weaker powers of the world.
Interviewer: Do you foresee a day when Pakistan might sign NPT?
Akram: Oh, yes. We will sign it today if India signs it. While we understand the injustice of the NPT we made it absolutely clear and we think we should both sign it because that is one way of keeping nuclear weapons out of South Asia. We will sign it not today but this morning in this half an hour if India will sign it. The only thing that will prevent us from signing the b... the, the treaty is the fact that India has not signed it. We are for it in terms of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. And we are prepared to sign it today. If India does not sign it Pakistan will not... never, never, never. No matter what the pressure.
Interviewer: Which countries is Pakistan concerned about in terms of being potential nuclear powers?
Akram: Against Pakistan?
Interviewer: Yes. In 1963 President Kennedy said there would be 25 nations possessing nuclear weapons by the seventies. I wondered how it comes to be that there's only five and possibly six: India. To what do you attribute that?
Akram: I think it was a misjudgment by him. I think we tend to misjudge things and things just take longer to happen. What is more, that he was speaking about trends and dangers that existed then. We now -- we've got a different -- As the Americans say, "a different ball game." Now we're thinking of elimination of nuclear weapons all together. In fact we've reversed the whole trend. The trend in the future, in the nineties maybe, reduce nuclear weapons and stop developing them. I will say that frankly President Kennedy wasn't necessarily a very good judge of the future. He made a statement that will not be accurate. I wouldn't have said at that time there'll be 23 states even now by the end of the century you might have at the most in the worst possible case you might have up to ten, ten powers. I don't think you'll have more than that. And I'm hoping you will not even have more than the present five. But we'll come to that later on.
Interviewer: How would you describe the objectives of the Indian nuclear program since 1974?
Akram: My view is that the Indian nuclear requirement is a matter of policy and psychology. I don't believe the Indians actually want to use nuclear weapons. It is my view. Many Pakistanis will say, "Oh! They'll get the bomb and they'll flatten our cities." I don't think so. The Indian requirement of the bomb is psychological. They want to show the world they have it as a status, a status symbol. "Hey look, we've got the bomb. We are part of the big, big five and now big six. We've joined the world powers." The big five today are the world powers; have got a political, a military power and the bomb. India wants to be the sixth one. I don't believe the Indians wish to use the bomb. I think they want to use it for psychological reasons as a status symbol. And I think their purpose in having it is to have it for status reasons, to appear to the world as a world power. Of course the, the nuclear lobby speaks of the danger from Pakistan. There've been books written on this, that Pakistan will make the bomb; it has the F16. It'll make the bomb. It'll then strike in Kashmir and you must make it. The Chinese have the bomb. They might strike from across the Himalayas so you must make the bomb. This is part of the nuclear fear being created by the nuclear lobby to persuade the government to become a nuclear weapons power. Basically the aim of the Indians in my view is to become a nuclear power for reasons of world status, to have the status of a global power, a big power. And not to actually use it to flatten any city around Pakistan or in Bangladesh or in China. This in my view is the basic purpose of it; to become a leading power, have nuclear science, nuclear technology and the greatness of a global power.
Interviewer: Do you think India does have the capability to manufacture bombs now?
Akram: Yes. I think they have the capability. I wouldn't hazard a guess as to how long it'll take them to make it. You will say how many days or how many weeks or how many hours. Now only a scientist can tell you that but India does have the capability of making the bomb at present. Yes it has.
Interviewer: Could you comment on their delivering capabilities?
Akram: Uh, frankly I do not know enough about it. I know that they are developing delivery capabilities through their rocket, their rocket uh, I can't m. . . systems and, and, and arrangements. That if you can get a rocket up into space which they're trying to do you can turn that rocket into an IRBM to take a nuclear weapon. But I don't know enough about the details of the delivery system.
Interviewer: Could you describe current Pakistan nuclear policy vis-a-vis nuclear weapons?
Akram: Well in the first place our policy is peaceful in that we have to have nuclear energy. And we are now fighting to have that energy in spite of our friends, not because of our friends -- in spite of our Western friends. We are now spending 60 percent of our, im... our export earnings on the import of petroleum. It can't go on. We don't have coal. We don't have oil to the amount that we need it. We have to go on to nuclear energy so we are going on to it. We have plans of establishing another six light water reactors by 1994 for which we will need actually enriched uranium which we have developed. We want to have more of those and we are being prevented from having it by our Western friends. The Americans have worked against our nuclear program to prevent us from having the Chashma program as we had. The French reluctantly agreed to join the Americans in not giving us the reprocessing plant that we wanted. So then we decided we will become independent. Because we want to have so many light water reactors of our own we will not depend for the supply of fuel on any foreign power which might turn off the supply and leave our light reactors high and dry. So the basic idea is we need nuclear energy and we must have that. As a corollary that gives us the capability of making the bomb through enriched uranium. We now have the capability of enriching it to about I think five percent or something. As far as I know we have not gone beyond that, have no desire, but we do have the capability of going beyond that. And Indians know that. And in my view if the Indians go beyond that stage of nuclear capability into actual nuclear actuality -become an actual weapons power, we will do that too. We'll find some way of doing it and we will do it. And this is the position about the capability. Basically we have to have nuclear power and uranium enrichment to have our own fuel supply for our reactors and be independent of foreign countries which have turned off our supply in the past. This gives us a nuclear weapons capability. And we will use that capability if required, if the Indians make their bomb. |
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 3A:
Pakistan's rivalry and conflicts with India
Interviewer: What would be Pakistan's response if India went nuclear?
Akram: Our response would be to follow suit. And we made that clear to India and I made it clear to the world. But the government hasn't. There's a [scholar]. But if India goes nuclear, we will go nuclear. And we know that if we go nuclear India will go nuclear. The two countries -- we are the protagonists of South Asia. We'll actually cross the threshold together or not cross it at all. If they go nuclear we will too.
Interviewer: What would be the consequences of that?
Akram: The consequences would be awful... awful in that both the countries will then get involved in a nuclear weapons race. With weapons it's not a case of making two bombs and saying, "Look" and wave the bomb, brandish a bomb. You get caught in a tide, or a movement if technology -- you've got to have delivery systems. You've got to perfect the bomb, put it on a plane. You have to have surveillance. You have to have space engineering, program, infrastructure, first-strike capability. It's -- you got to go on and on and on. You can't just make two bombs, then stop. And both countries will be caught in this nuclear rush. And by the end of the century we will have a kind of South Asian MAD. And we'll say both are nuclear powers able to destroy each other and we'll be s... weill, we'll both have destroyed the economy of both the countries. It'll have a bad effect on the economy, on the antipoverty programs. It'll have solved nothing. It'll solve no problem. Kashmir will still be there. Everything will still be there. We will have added another dimension to our conflict. And this is why we are opposing it. We are saying to India, "For heavens sake, don't make the bomb. We don't need it." We are saying, "You don't need it except against us. You can't fight China with a bomb. China's much too powerful. We don't need it except against you. We can't fight the Russians with a bomb. It's only needed against each other. It'll not be made except against each other and in response to the other one's move." So we've said, "Let's not make the bomb. It'll complicate an already complex situation and let's stop at this." I hope it'll work.
Interviewer: There's been a lot of press coverage in the West about Pakistan going ahead with the nuclear test, that Pakistan is holding all the cards in her hand.
Akram: Uh, well about that nuclear test in September, there was a report -- now that was very childish for anybody in America or anywhere in the world to imagine that we could have a secret explosion. It's not a cracker, like a little cracker that you have or fireworks. A bomb is a bomb. And we have satellites allover the sky everywhere watching every bit of the earth. It was rather childish to suggest that Pakistan in September had an explosion in Balochistan. Unthinkable. It was rejected by the world. The world said, "Nonsense. Indian's took it up. They blew it up. "The danger of Pakistan." We have not done any tests of any kind. We are not quite sure what tests we have to do. I'm not a nuclear scientist. I don't understand the mechanics of it, how it is done. I just know in terms of policy that we have the ability but I don't know more than that. But as for their report in the Washington Time... Washington Post about the September thing, it was childish. How can you have a nuclear explosion and nobody knows that -- knows where it has been done.
Interviewer: What about an Islamic bomb?
Akram: Now that is part of the propaganda against Pakistan. Somehow -- you know my view is that in the West a lot of attention is paid to cliches. They go by slogans, cliches, Islamic fundamentalism. No one knows what it means. Islamic bomb. You don't have a Christian bomb. If you say London has a Christian bomb and China has a communist bomb. And the Kremlin has a Red bomb or a Blue bomb but they -- the slogan came up of the Islamic bomb and so on. There is no such thing as an Islamic bomb. If we were to make the bomb as a reaction to India's capability it would be a Pakistani bomb. It would not be a bomb for anybody else to use. Not for anybody else in the world. There's no question of an Islamic bomb any more than you'd be allowed, you'd be prepared to give the Canadians your bomb. You use our bomb. There's no Islamic bomb. Well it's a bomb? There's no American bomb or Western or White, Black or Brown or Yellow bomb. It is just a bomb like any other bomb.
Interviewer: Could you comment on the application of the theory of nuclear deterrence being applied in South Asia? Do you see that as a possibility?
Akram: I see uh, an advanced stage of nuclear deterrence which in some way would predate the emergence of nuclear weapons. Now let me explain. India has the capability of making the bomb. We have the capability also. I know -- I'm convinced India wants to make the bomb not to use it against Pakistan but just to have it as a status symbol so it'll fit in with this aim of becoming a world power. But India fears that if Pakistan also makes the bomb we'll be caught in this tide of forward movement and there'll -- lot of mistrust of Pakistan in India. They think these mad Pakistanis might use the bomb. In spite of the difference in size between the two countries there's more fear of Pakistan in India than vice versa. So because of that Indians hesitate to make the bomb. If we did not have the capability they would make the bomb because nobody in the world can stop them. The Americans can't. The Russians can't. No one can stop them making the bomb. If they make the bomb the world will say, "Well, they made the bomb. It's, it's bad luck but they've got it. That's all you can do about it." The only thing will stop them from making the bomb is Pakistan's capability of making it. Now I maintain that this will probably come out to be true in the nineties and you'll realize that the only thing which is stopping India from making the bomb and thus it is preventing South Asia from going nuclear, is Pakistanis capability. That if India makes the bomb, we will. And if both sides had the bomb there is a danger of somebody using it. And therefore neither side should. And, and thus it in my opinion that just as between East and West the possession of the bomb is a guarantee against its use by the other side. In South Asia the capability of manufacture is a guarantee of its manufacture by the other side. So we've gone one step pre... pre-bomb, that even before the bomb is made the capability of manufacture is preventing the manufacture of the bomb in South Asia. I maintain that Pakistan and India by having the capability are stopping each other from making the bomb and this is the best way not to make the bomb. I hope.
Interviewer: Do you think that nuclear weapons are the currency of power?
Akram: I haven't thought about it. I think the effect is exaggerated. I have a feeling that uh, the uh, the currency of power -- it is, this is exaggerated by the Indians quite a lot. They are pressing the government to go nuclear because they regard that as a currency of power. But I'm not sure if it is. Anyway, I haven't thought a great deal about this particular question.
Interviewer: Are there any other countries which Pakistan is concerned about in terms of actually getting weapons capability?
Akram: Well, no. Not really. Mind you, we are very Pan-Islamic and we feel very closely for the Arab countries. We re... we regard them as brothers. In fact, if I may just -little digression. When you speak of Islamic fundamentalism and so on, with us the Islamic ideology is a case of a mystical bond of Islamic brotherhood. It's not fundamentalism. It's not a particular sect. There's that mystical bond which is something beautiful in Islam. We feel for every Muslim as a brother. And so we support every Muslim cause. And because of this we are anti-Israel. We are not anti-Jew. You know enough about Islam I think to know that Moses is my prophet too. Moses is the prophet of Islam. It's not being anti-Jew as a religion. It's anti-Zionism. We're anti-Israel because of the Arab situation as it is. And if they have the bomb we fear for the Arabs because they might use it one day if they have a difficult position. But that is rather far away from us. And I don't think we've -- I've -- We have studied that at the institute as uh, a matter of, of geopolitical significance for Pakistan.
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 3B:
Interviewer: When Israel attacked the Osiraq reactor in Iraq were there fears that India might do the same in Pakistan?
Akram: I won't say there was fear. There was some concern that India might do that. Some even thought that Israel might do that in collusion with India. As far as we are concerned the two of them, since they're both hostile to Pakistan might collude on this matter but we are prepared for it. If that happens we are prepared. And it is -- we, we were led to believe that India did consider that as a possibility. It was studied by the high command. When Indira Gandhi was still alive. I think in '82 or '83. Uh, but then they gave up the idea because they were afraid that Pakistan would strike an Indian nuclear installations at Trombay and Tarapur, the two major ones at -- near Bombay. They're called Trombay and Tarapur. So it was a fear of a reprisal which was the biggest uh, factor in preventing the Indians from going further into a possible attack on Kahuta, on our nuclear establishment.
Interviewer: Could you forecast the next ten years in the nuclear age, what you think is going to happen particularly in terms of nuclear proliferation; horizontal proliferation.
Akram: No. I'd be guessing. Because frankly I h... I haven't thought about it and I, I don't really know enough to be able to volunteer an opinion.
Interviewer: Can you recreate for me the 1965 war and your role in it and also explain the antagonism which was -- date back to beyond '65.
Akram: Well... The '65 war was the first major war between India and Pakistan. And in that war I was Chief of Staff of an infantry division at the front. It was a war which we enjoyed fighting. You may think it's funny enjoying a war but as soldiers we enjoyed the war because we fought it against a power much bigger than us and we fought them to a standstill. We claimed it as a victory. And later we found the Indians also claimed it as a victory. So it was actually a drawn war. But just the fact that we could fight a giant like India and fight them to a draw was a feather in our cap. Now the war started off ostensibly on, in Kashmir in that Pakistan went into Kashmir. And India said, "You attacked us." And we said, "No. We attacked Kashmir. Kashmir is not Paki... is not India. It is different." But actually it is my view that the tension which eventually led to the '65 war and which continued after that was not because of Kashmir but, but part of a deeper divide which exists between India and Pakistan. And that divide relates... relates to the role consciousness of the two peoples. The Indians think of themselves as a potential great power -- a world power, that they have world role to perform. And we thought of ourselves at partition as a leading Islamic, Islamic nation of the world, as a powerful force for, for Islam. And we thought we'd act as the leaders of the Islamic world. We were not going to accept Indian hegemony or Indian domination of South Asia. And so the role consciousness of the two countries put them on a collision course and they collided again and again. And in a way they're still colliding it is the national aim of the two countries which projects. You, you could say that both sides are being a bit arrogant in their aims. But the fact is that they have an aim of becoming a world power. We regard ourselves as the strongest Muslim power in the world, which we are. But we think of ourselves as a servant of the Muslim world and not the masters. Now we don't. And this has put us on a collision course and this is the main -- the deep divide between India and Pakistan. Kashmir is a symptom, not the cause. It is a symptom of a deeper disease which I'll explain. If Kashmir were not there there'd be something else to create friction between the two countries.
Interviewer: If you could explain the sort of human side to this debate... how do you explain this animosity between India and Pakistan?
Akram: Well it has to be related not to specific issues which create discord but to general, general trends or the general feeling of the nations. In my opinion disputes like Kashmir -- are not the cause of trouble. They are the symptoms of trouble. Uh, they're symptoms of a deeper disease. The trouble between India and Pakistan arises from their role consciousness and this began with partition with independence in 1947. Uh, India suddenly emerged as a potential world power. And Nehru said, "We are cut out for greatness. We'll wear the mantle of glory of the British. We'll take on the role of the British and we'll be a big power." And Pakistan said, "No you won't." Because we also had ideas of bigness. We were the bigness Muslim state at that time. The largest Muslim power in the world. And we set ourselves up as the leading Muslim nation of the world to guide and help all Muslim causes. And we were not going to accept India as the leading power of South Asia or of any region. And this was a bit of a clash. It started a clash because we were not going to accept India as a potential or real world power, or the eminent power of South Asia as the Indians thought they would be... or were. And somehow because Pakistan was not prepared to accept India as a potential world power it made Pakistan an obstacle in India's march to greatness as they saw it. And that obstacle had to be removed from the Indian's part. This put us on a collision course. And we went on colliding. It was actually a role consciousness and then it was a matter of the national aim. India's aim was then identified by the Indian elite as to become a world power. In a short term, to be the leading, leading power of South Asia. In the long term to be a world power like the present big five. Our aim mainly was to, to, to, to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan in the light of Islamic ideology. But somehow India had to make its weight felt against Pakistan and the aims also clashed. So generally we thought that uh, with Indian aim as it is and ours as it is it's going to keep us on a collision course and both sides then were prepared for future collisions. And somehow the capability of collision, encourages collision -- armaments and so on. So the basic reason for the animosity is not a specific issue like the sea question today or the uh, uh... the Kashmir question which is now forty years old. It is the basic role consciousness of the national personality of the two countries.
Interviewer: When was the biggest amount of tension between the two countries?
Akram: The biggest moment was right at the very start when Pakistan came into being. Pakistan and India. It was a most literally bloody bath... literally it was a bloody bath and the tension was highest in just a few weeks or months which followed partition. In those few weeks, we killed a million people. A million people were killed in a holocaust which spread across the border of the two countries in the India-Punjab and the, and the Pakistani-Punjab -- on both sides. And a few other cities also in both countries. A million people of whom half were Indian, half were Pakistani whose only crime was that they lived on the wrong side of the border. Men, women, children. They were slaughtered. It was shameful. It was disgraceful. And no remorse on either side either. I, in my opinion, the gravest tension was at the very start. Sometimes it rises, it f... it, it rises and falls. It goes on. It's not easy to say when again it became the highest. It rose in '50, '51 down again. Rose in '65 down again '71. It's high again now. It has been rising and falling. So the tension remains as a permanent condition of the relationship. India and Pakistan will remain in a state of tension. What we hope to achieve is to reduce the tension, to control it -- not pre... not, not allow the tension to explode in war. But the tension was worst at partition and after that there has been a rise and fall in the last forty years.
Interviewer: What's your recollections of the 1971 war?
Akram: The '71 war was a traumatic one for Pakistan in that we suff... suffered a defeat technically which we did not in '65 and we lost a part of our territory which was cut away by the Indian armed forces. East Pakistan was taken away by the Indian armed forces. It became Bangladesh. And now the, the Bangladeshis are happy to be Bangladesh. Well that's fine. But as far as we were concerned we lost it because of the Indian armed forces assisted by the liberation forces. What was horrible was the whole campaign which was orchestrated by the Indians against Pakistan to show Pakistan as a brutal, horrible people, West Pakistanis brutalizing and ill-treating the poor little East Pakistanis. It wasn't true at all. As a matter of fact this campaign worked in turning world opinion against us -- not entirely. Because I know the Americans as late as, as October -- President Nixon thought he had received a promise from Mrs. Indira Ghandi that she would not launch an armed invasion of East Pakistan. She gave him that understanding and having done that she prepared for the invasion. In fact President Nixon was hoping that we would be able to solve our problem in East Pakistan without resort to war. But Indians didn't wait for that. They wanted to cut away East Pakistan and they did. I was a, a divisional commander in that war in the western part of the country, what was then West Pakistan at the front. We didn't do a great deal because the main action took place in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. But it was a horrible war for us because for the first time we actually lost the war. Well, technically. Nobody could have won it. |
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Transkrip temubual Bhg 3C:
India-Pakistan war, 1971
Interviewer: Let me ask you about the 1971 war. First, your personal experience there but also what it meant. Did it mean a sense of loss to pakistan? How did it feel?
Akram: Well I was a divisional commander in that war. I was stationed -- my division was in what was then West Pakistan, is now Pakistan, at the front. Uh, it was a traumatic event for Pakistan in that we not only lost part of our territory to an enemy whom we knew was an enemy.
Interviewer: Could we start again?
Akram: Uh, well I was a divisional commander in the '71 war and my division was stationed at the front in the western part, what was then West Pakistan and now Pakistan. Uh, '71 was a very traumatic and painful experience for us because A1 we lost a part of our territory and B1 we suffered a defeat from India. Well we maintained that we would not be defeated by India. It so happened that the Indians attacked the Pakistan core in East Pakistan under conditions when we were in a weak position. Our forces there were not able to resist and so it was easy for the Indians to secure a victory. It wasn't a great victory anyway. But from our point of view it was terrible to suffer a defeat at the hand of the Indians. At the same time and losing part of our territory. It was a painful experience. It took us time to get over it. I think we have got over it now.
Interviewer: The 1971 war -- what did this mean for Pakistan, the defeat in that war?
Akram: Well... I was a divisional commander in that war and my division was stationed at the front on the western side, what was then called West Pakistan and is now just Pakistan. Uh, from the point of view of our own response or reaction to that war; it was a most painful and most traumatic experience for Pakistan in that we lost a part of, part of our country to a neighbor who had always acted as the enemy of Pakistan. And we hated the idea of losing a war to India. It was also a matter of national pride or a matter of professional pride in the Pakistan army. Because we were as good as the Indians. So we suffered in that way also. It was traumatic in that the Indians had built up and orchestrated a world-wide propaganda campaign against Pakistan to project Pakistanis or West Pakistanis as brutal and cruel colonizing people who were colonizing and ill treating the East Pakistanis. And in a way the impression was created that we were the bad guys and they were the good guys. It wasn't shared by everybody. As a matter of fact our American allies uh, stood by us uh, in a political sense in that President Nixon did try and persuade Mrs. Indira Gandhi not to start a war on, on the East Pakistan issue. And I think he did extract a promise from her that she wouldn't. But she went back on her promise and she did actually -when she came back from her visit to Washington she gave orders for the finalization of the plan to invade East Pakistan. It was a traumatic and painful experience for us. It took us time to get over it. But that is the kind of war we will not be -- hope not to fight again. |
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bro...lu sudah hijack kawan ni punya thread da....heheh |
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Reply 1# perang_sivil
Khalid memang sejarah perang nya hebat... Tapi sebenar nya ada juga sejarah lain mengenai Khalid Al Walid ni. 1. Membunuh suami seorang perempuan kerana ingin mengahwini perempuan itu. 2. Antara orang yang menyerang rumah Saiyidina Ali kerana mahu Saiyidina Ali memberi taat setia kepasa Saiyidina Abu Bakar yang baru terlantik sebagai khalifah.. Khalid banyak kontroversi. |
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Pasal #1 tu, masa dah memluk Islam atau sebelum tu? Kalau sebelum tu tak heran la.. |
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Dah Islam... Masa memerangi orang-orang murtad selepas Abu Bakar jadi khalifah... Try cari, kot di Pekan Rabu ada jual buku sejarah dia.. |
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Reply 32# Laxamana.
Suami anak sedara aku, ngaji madrasah di Afrika Selatan ada cite;
"sejahat-jahat" Hajjaj Yusuf as Saqafi yg dikatakan membunuh Sahabat, malam2 dia tahajjud 200 rakaat 000!
Kita 2 rakaat tiap malam pon belum tentu.
So sebaik2nya kita serah aje kpd Tuhan pasal "perilaku" para Sahabat yg tentunya ibadah jauh lebih hebat drpd kita. Sayugia jgn komen lebih2.
Ntah2 yg menulis sejarah pun belum tentu lebih baik, especially kalau mereka tidak hidup di dalam 300 tahun selepas hijrah. |
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Khalid memang sejarah perang nya hebat... Tapi sebenar nya ada juga sejarah lain mengenai Khalid Al Walid ni.
Itu mmg ada.
1. Membunuh suami seorang perempuan kerana ingin mengahwini perempuan itu.
Cuba baca buku biografi Khalid Al-Walid oleh AI Akram nih. Ada dinyatakan juga kisah ni, tp para ilmuwan masih lg mempertikai kisah tu, sbb ada versi lain juga.
2. Antara orang yang menyerang rumah Saiyidina Ali kerana mahu Saiyidina Ali memberi taat setia kepasa Saiyidina Abu Bakar yang baru terlantik sebagai khalifah..
Ini subjektif ... hanya ada dlm sumber sejarah pro-Syiah. Tapi takde dlm sumber sejarah Sunnah atau Islam kontemporari.
Khalid banyak kontroversi.
Itu mmg ya. |
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Banyak sejarah Islam mempunyai fakta yang dikhuatiri telah diselewengkan untuk kepentingan sesuatu pihak. Jangan telan bulat-bulat je bila baca buku seperti kisah Khalid Al Walid ni.. Cuba baca apa kata Khalid di hujung usia nya, bila dia tidak berjaya mencapai syahid di dalam peperangan, sebagai contoh. Syahid itu anugerah, bukan boleh ditempah-tempah.. Dari segi strategi, memang Khalid bagus, strategi nya yang kerap flanking dan menggunakan serangan decoy mirip kepada taktik perang Alexander The Great.. Kedua nya menggunakan light cavalry. Kuda pantas dengan light armour.. |
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Pasal #1 tu, masa dah memluk Islam atau sebelum tu? Kalau sebelum tu tak heran la..
alphawolf Post at 3-10-2010 07:55 
sebelom kot....sbb Khalid masuk Islam selepas perjanjian Hudaibiah kan? |
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Banyak sejarah Islam mempunyai fakta yang dikhuatiri telah diselewengkan untuk kepentingan sesuatu pihak. Jangan telan bulat-bulat je bila baca buku seperti kisah Khalid Al Walid ni.. Cuba baca apa kata Khalid di hujung usia nya, bila dia tidak berjaya mencapai syahid di dalam peperangan, sebagai contoh. Syahid itu anugerah, bukan boleh ditempah-tempah.. Dari segi strategi, memang Khalid bagus, strategi nya yang kerap flanking dan menggunakan serangan decoy mirip kepada taktik perang Alexander The Great.. Kedua nya menggunakan light cavalry. Kuda pantas dengan light armour..
Masalahnya sekarang, banyak buku2 mengenai Khalid atau pahlawan Islam lainnya hanya menyentuh kisah2 tidak bercorak militeri, sekadar menceritakan sudut peperangan secara umum. Karya arwah Jeneral AI Akram sahaja yang berani mengupas strategi, taktik, objektif, misi, operasi kebanyakan peperangan yang disertai Khalid Al-Waleed menerusi teropong militer. Dan Jeneral AI Akram bukan calang2, bukannya armchair general, tetapi pernah terlibat dengan perang Indo-Pakistan lebih 2 kali, malahan beliau sendiri turun ke hampir semua lokasi sejarah dimana berlakunya kempen militeri Khalid. Beliau juga menggunakan kaedah perbandingan sejarah melalui sumber2 Islami & Orientalis, menyisih pendapat pro / bias kedua2 sumber, & menggunakan ekstrapolasi logikal berdasarkan pengalaman ketenteraannya sendiri dalam menterjemah kempen militeri Khalid.
Kita dah banyak sangat disuap itu, disuap ini dengan pemikiran & corak pertahanan dari dunia Barat, mahupun disogok karya Sun Tzu dll. Tapi, kita jarang diberi satu naskhah yang menceritakan terperinci mengenai kempen militeri Pedang Allah dari sudut aplikasi ketenteraan.
Sebab itu buku karya arwah Jeneral AI Akram sepatutnya menjadi bahan telaah & rujukan para pegawai ATM. |
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Post time 27-9-2010 01:32 AM
Post time 4-10-2010 12:23 AM
