FPDA - Is it still relevant or not for Malaysia and this region?

advark

udahlah cuk..sering banget kasus FPDA dalam porem indon....
rasanya keterlaluan banget ketakuta ...
gede-bab Post at 23-5-2011 17:36

nak berkelit kok guna porem!xrelevan cik tengok la tindakan gomen anda di dunia nyata,  dulu je semasa TNI latihan gabungan besar2ran di dekat sempadan mesia, tetiba je fpda lgsng mengadakan latihan tandingan dimesia, kenape tidak diadakan dinegara lain, kenape masanya yg serba mendadak(bersamaan).. kenape begitu cik?

advark

Reply  advark


Indon aje yg ada hasrat nak invade negara asia tenggara lain. Mana ada negara la ...
RainbowSix Post at 25-5-2011 03:27

ko putus asa ker?iye lah mesia strooongggg.....daripada ko jealous lebih baik ko anjurkan ke gomen ko agar pembelian brahmos tuk TLDM di percepat.

advark

bak kata pepatah..biar papa asalkan bergaya...
tempur Post at 25-5-2011 07:18

komen sarcasm wak, alah dasar india bodoh..uppss silap...dasar indon bodoh

d'zeck

komen sarcasm wak, alah dasar india bodoh..uppss silap...dasar indon bodoh
advark Post at 27-5-2011 15:33

bagus wak.. akhirnya mampu juga indon sepertimu
mengakui akan kebodohan sendiri haha

d'zeck

nak berkelit kok guna porem!xrelevan cik tengok la tindakan gomen anda di dunia nyata,  dulu j ...
advark Post at 27-5-2011 15:23

kan jelas kebodohanmu

latihan fpda sememangnya mengikut jadual rutin,
perancangannya tidak dibuat dalam tempoh sehari dua
manakala lokasinya samada di malaysia ataupun singapura sahaja

yang jelas indon yang terburu2 buat wayang dengan ujian peluru berpandu
terbaru hibahnya, sebab dah tak tahan asyik tengok TLDM je yang selalu
buat ujian penembakan sebenar sebelum2 ini.. indon : a failed country

advark

kan jelas kebodohanmu

latihan fpda sememangnya mengikut jadual rutin,
perancangannya tidak d ...
d'zeck Post at 27-5-2011 15:54

hahaha..jadual rutin kata ko..lawaknya? terkadang anggota FPDA yg ikut latihanpun pernah tak lengkap,biasanya akan lengkap manakala ada pergerakan dari militer indonesia disempadan yg menurut sudut pandang anggota FPDA perlu diantisipasi atau bahkan perlu di intip.

sy kasih tahu sama korang , missile yakhont di beli indonesia pada thn 2005 dan pada thn 2008 dah masuk inventory TNI AL , atlast baru thn 2011 ni missile yakhont itu di dedahkan ke halayak umum termasuk di uji coba pelancarannya.

advark

delete:salah masuk thread!

gede-bab

kan jelas kebodohanmu

latihan fpda sememangnya mengikut jadual rutin,
perancangannya tidak d ...
d'zeck Post at 27-5-2011 15:54

yang aku sering lihat foto-foto KRI indon lancarkan perlu memang ada tapi sasaran yang kena tak tunjuk pula...

wak advark foto peluru yakhont menghantam sasaran ada gak??

d'zeck

hahaha..jadual rutin kata ko..lawaknya? terkadang anggota FPDA yg ikut latihanpun pernah tak l ...
advark Post at 27-5-2011 16:09

tak perlu dikasi tahu, kerana itulah faktanya

indon suka goyangnya lebih.. haha

gede-bab

tak perlu dikasi tahu, kerana itulah faktanya

indon suka goyangnya lebih.. haha
d'zeck Post at 27-5-2011 16:29

kan aku dah kata indon serem banget dengar nama FPDA!!

hijazzains

want to add....FPDA is just an agreement..not an official military alliance..so far the exercises are good but...in a crisis..Malaysia will only consult FPDA, i think this was highlighted in some other defence boards..the FPDA will be all talk and no action...not necessarily the bloody ozzies and the singkies will help us...WTF they help us if they get dragged in?

robotech

A Strategist retrospective: the future of the Five Power Defence Arrangement



The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is often overlooked as a regional security institution, and is a curious security device that embodies several paradoxes. The Arrangements’ most important roles are not discussed openly. And the most important non-regional player in the FPDA is not necessarily the one which plays the most prominent role in terms of its conventional military commitment. Moreover, while the FPDA is apparently anachronistic, in reality it continues to serve vital security roles and will do so in the future.

To expand on the first of these paradoxes: the FPDA is often characterised as a Cold War leftover that is irrelevant to the current and future security concerns of regional states. However, while the FPDA was created during the Cold War in the context of the military withdrawal by the UK from Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its key roles were never Cold War specific. The five powers involved have always held diverse motives for participating in the Arrangements. However, discussion of two of the FPDA’s core rationales has always been essentially taboo.

The first of these implicit roles has been for the FPDA to act as a hedge against a resurgence of an unstable and threatening Indonesia which might endanger the security of Malaysia and Singapore, and perhaps also the wider sub-regional balance of power to the detriment of Australia, New Zealand and maybe the United Kingdom. While this has not been a realistic or immediate prospect since the FPDA was established in 1971, the ouster of Indonesia’s President Suharto in 1998 and the ensuing instability there over the following three to four years may have reminded FPDA members—particularly Malaysia and Singapore—of the origins of the Arrangements after Jakarta’s Konfrontasi of 1963–6. And while Indonesia’s trajectory in terms of domestic stability and its willingness to play a constructive role regionally and internationally has seemed encouraging under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, there remain disquieting domestic political trends that could lead to the world’s fourth most populous country becoming a less congenial neighbour in the future.

The FPDA’s second implicit role has been to maintain essential channels of communication on defence and military matters between Malaysia and Singapore, and to build strategic confidence between these two Southeast Asian states whose sporadic mutual distrust sometimes highlights underlying existential tensions.

Neither of these FPDA roles can be discussed openly in Southeast Asia, for fear of further undermining sometimes strained relations within the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore triangle. Nevertheless, in recent years the five powers have displayed considerable flexibility in interpreting the FPDA’s security ambit, notably adapting their exercise series in response to strategic concerns du jour, such as terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). These exercises have doubtless helped to build a degree of interoperability between the forces of FPDA members, which has sometimes proved useful operationally outside the FPDA context. This was certainly true in the Australian-led intervention and security presence in East Timor from 1999: ultimately, forces from all FPDA member-states were deployed in the territory. Familiarity deriving from FPDA contacts might also have helped some FPDA member-states’ armies to operate alongside each other in Afghanistan.

Turning to the second paradox, it is clearly Australia that has played the most active role among the three extra-regional FPDA participants, both diplomatically and in terms of its contribution of forces to FPDA exercises. The UK has never contributed either diplomatic enthusiasm or forces to the FPDA on the scale of Australia, and the British government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2010 further undermined the UK’s capacity to project expeditionary military power. However, successive UK governments’ commitment to perpetuating the UK’s status as one of five permanent UN Security Council members, and as a nuclear-weapons state maintaining a strategic second-strike capability is often overlooked in the Asia-Pacific region. The UK’s continuing involvement in the FPDA, which notably survived the 2010 SDSR, is significant for its FPDA partners and for other regional states because of Britain’s continuing diplomatic and strategic weight.

One of the most frequently-heard comments about the FPDA is that it is ‘out-dated’. Putting aside its possible continuing relevance in the immediate vicinity of Malaysia and Singapore, the changing strategic environment in the wider Asia-Pacific region suggests a range of adverse future scenarios in which membership of the FPDA could valuably supplement member states’ other external security arrangements.

All signs are that the Asia-Pacific region’s strategic environment will be characterised by these major features:

- further shifts in the distribution of power as the strategic weight of China increases (India seems less certain) relative to the US
- potential flashpoints for state-on-state conflict, including the Taiwan Straits, the Korean peninsula and the waters around China including the South China Sea
- increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, particularly in the maritime sphere
increased pressure on already fragile states due to climate change
- offensive military capability build-ups
- weak multilateral regional security institutions with little capacity to mitigate regional tensions and conflicts
- mini-lateral security relations rather than formal alliances

Against this backdrop, the FPDA—with its mix of regional and extra-regional member-states, lack of formal alliance commitments, and proven adaptability—hardly seems anachronistic. Rather, it is particularly well-suited to the likely future strategic circumstances. The FPDA is a non-provocative form of hedging and confidence-building, and it would be surprised if any of the participating member-states chose to discard their FPDA commitments or contributions.

Tim Huxley is executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia). Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au ... efence-arrangement/

robotech

Malaysian–Australian relations: close to the limit (part I)



It might actually be said that Australia is Malaysia’s closest military cooperation partner. The close defence relationship between our countries is one that has come about due to various factors, including the common security umbrella of the Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) and a long legacy of Australian presence and sacrifice on Malaysian soil, in both World War II and the communist emergency. And we can add to that the long period of bilateral military training, exercises and cooperation that the two countries have had.

Australian military officers have long been serving in various training capacities in Malaysia and as such have built close relations with the Malaysian officers they have trained. In 1989, the current Australian Chief of Defence Force, General David Hurley, served a posting as the Mechanised Infantry Adviser, Australian Army Project Team Malaysia. Among the Malaysian Army officers he worked closely with while in Malaysia was the current Malaysian Chief of Defence Force, General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin. As well, numerous Malaysian officers have undergone initial and advanced training and education in Australia, and, at the same time, Australian officers have been regular fixtures in student classes of the Malaysian Staff College. Similar exchanges and training have been carried out for NCOs and enlisted ranks. All this has fostered a strong personal tie and bond between the militaries of both countries.

Australia is one of very few countries (the other being France) which actually has an officer working inside the Malaysian Ministry of Defence (to oversee the operations of the Malaysian Australian Joint Defence Program). Such was the closeness of the ties between the two countries that when Malaysia was preparing to deploy its team in Afghanistan via C-130s of the Royal Malaysian Air Force last year, the Royal Australian Air Force provided the free use of its C-130 mission training simulators in Australia as part of the RMAF pilots’ training. While the RMAF had a C-130 simulator, there was no mission module which replicated expected conditions in Afghanistan.

However, despite the closeness of the ties between the two countries in the military sphere, there remains a limit as to how far it can be taken due to several factors, some of which have the potential to impact upon existing cooperation between the Malaysian and Australian militaries.

One such factor is perhaps the difference in the way the two countries see the application or participation on their military forces on the global stage. Fundamentally, the Australian military has always been structured as an expeditionary and interventionist military force and, from a Malaysian perspective, political decision making to commit the Australian military overseas has been guided in some ways by idealism and moral principles. Conversely, the Malaysian military is a largely territorial and peacekeeping military force with the decision to commit overseas based on a realpolitik estimate of the economic and political value of such to Malaysia. The result is that there is a limit as to how far both countries want to commit towards joint training. Apart from the FPDA, regional peacekeeping deployments like Cambodia and East Timor and HADR operations, these fundamental differences mean that the joint deployment and/or cooperation between Malaysian and Australian military forces in a coalition seems highly unlikely.

It should be noted that in two global areas of operations where both Australia and Malaysia are present—namely, the Gulf of Aden and Afghanistan—neither countries’ military forces deployed there are cooperating on a close basis or are integrated operationally. In Gulf of Aden naval operations, Australia has been operating under the mandate of CTF-151, a multinational task force established for counterpiracy operations. Malaysia in turn opted for a narrow, national mission of escorting ships belonging to Malaysian shipping company (MISC), while rendering assistance where possible to any vessel facing pirate attacks in the vicinity of the RMN ships operating there. In Afghanistan, while both countries operate under the ISAF mandate, the very nature of Australia’s combat oriented mission in a contested sector means that there is no possibility of the 40 plus Malaysian military medical team being stationed with the Australian military, despite the ties and cooperation between the two. Instead, Malaysia deployed alongside the New Zealand PRT in what was then perceived to be a quiet sector of Bamiyan province. So it might not be surprising if neither country wants to deepen the relationship. The factors at work in these two deployments reflect differing outlooks on global military commitments.

In fact, the current strong Malaysian–Australian relations may actually limit future cooperation. Given that military cooperation today often functions as an aid to diplomacy and diplomatic ties between countries, military cooperation with Malaysia may be overridden by the priority for Australia to pursue military cooperation with countries that Australia has a historically more difficult relationship with, such as Indonesia. In my next post I’ll examine some other issues in the Australia–Malaysia defence relationship, such as the asymmetry of the defence budgets of the two countries, and their very different views of national security.

Dzirhan Mahadzir is a defence journalist, Malaysia correspondent for Janes Defence Weekly and former guest lecturer on military history and strategy, Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College. Image courtesy of the Department of Defence.

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au ... o-the-limit-part-i/

robotech

Malaysian–Australian relations: close to the limit (part II)



In my last post, I outlined the development of the long-standing defence relationship between Australia and Malaysia. While there is strong history between both militaries, the difference in the ways in which they are utilised accounts for, in part, the limit to how close a defence relationship there can be. Here, I examine additional factors impacting on Australia–Malaysia cooperation.

First is the issue of defence budgets; both countries are facing the issues of limited budgets for their militaries which in turn affects their capability for future training, particularly when having to deploy assets out of country. Indeed the RMAF’s non-participation at this year’s RAAF Pitch Black exercise in Australia was due to a lack of funding. It might be expected that both militaries may have to curtail some of their activities in the future in order to accommodate the budget.

Second, further expansion of training and cooperation may largely be moot due to the existing commitments of both nations. All three services of the ADF are heavily involved with Australia’s global missions and, with the presence of the US military in Darwin, the ADF will add additional joint exercise and training activities to its schedule and thus be limited in what it can provide in regard to other bilateral military cooperation and training. In Malaysia, the Royal Malaysian Navy and RMAF face the problem that their forces are undersized for patrolling Malaysia’s extensive maritime waters and airspace and as such are heavily committed, which limits the assets and personnel available for cooperation and training with foreign forces. The Malaysian Army, given its size, could easily accommodate an increased scope of military exercises with its Australian Army counterparts in the form of company- or battalion-sized mechanised, armour or artillery exercises. But the fact that both countries have sufficient training areas for such in their respective countries means that neither army can justify the costs of shipping heavy equipment and troops overseas for an exercise, particularly in an era of budgetary restraint.

Finally, the fact remains that Malaysia is still finding its feet in developing both a national security policy and a policy in relation to the armed forces and its use in a regional and global security context. Fundamentally, the root of the problem lies in the Mahathir era; not only was decision and policymaking highly centralised around then Prime Minister Tun Mahathir, he was at the helm for far too long. I don’t think that Mahathir ever really understood the role, context and use of a nation’s military. At the same time, he failed to develop the concept, principles and ideals of national security for Malaysia in relation to the global environment—though I might wryly add that he overdeveloped national security in the domestic context. Mahathir’s successor, Tun Abdullah Badawi failed to remedy the shortcomings he inherited.

Part of the blame should also fall upon the Malaysian National Security Division: while Mahathir’s autocratic nature may have stifled the NSD in developing a clear national security strategy, there is no excuse for the NSD to have failed to initiate efforts to address this issue in the more open administrations of Badawi or current Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Razak. While Najib Tun Razak has more experience in the defence and security field from his two tenures as Defence Minister, at the moment he is preoccupied with domestic politics.The need for him to prepare for a general election which must be held by 2013 coupled with the intense political battles (or one should more aptly say, nonsense) that has been going on in Malaysia between the ruling coalition and political opposition for the past four years has led to little focus by Najib on articulating how the Malaysian military should be employed in a regional or global security context. In absence of clear policy guidance, it is difficult to see how best to foster further military cooperation which dovetails with Malaysia’s national security outlook or goals in regard to the regional and global environment.

For all of those reasons, Malaysia–Australia defence cooperation efforts might now have reached their limits.

Dzirhan Mahadzir is a defence journalist, Malaysia correspondent for Janes Defence Weekly and former guest lecturer on military history and strategy, Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.

Source:
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au ... -the-limit-part-ii/

robotech

Five Power Defence Arrangements remain relevant today, say defence chiefs

Jermyn Chow
The Straits Times
Sunday, Nov 10, 2013


Gen Houghton of Britain said the FPDA helps maintain stability in the region because it links countries in the region to countries outside it. FPDA drills are "a smarter way of using militaries", he added.

The world's second-oldest military partnership, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), remains relevant in tackling today's non-traditional threats and maintaining stability in the region.

Making this observation, defence chiefs of 42-year-old grouping's member countries - Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia - also said there is no need to expand the grouping's current size and scope for now.

The FPDA, which came into force in 1971, was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to provide for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore until the then new states could fend for themselves.

Singapore's defence chief, Lieutenant-General Ng Chee Meng, said on Thursday that the grouping has made good progress since its inception to cement ties in the region through dialogue and joint exercises. To remain relevant, the grouping has, since 2006, gone beyond its military remit to include non-traditional threats like terrorism and disaster relief operations.

He cited how Singaporean and Australian troops pitched in to help New Zealanders in 2011 after the Christchurch earthquake. This, Lt-Gen Ng said, was due to the "trust, friendship and phone calls that we can make across the different time zones".

Amid the growing prominence of other multilateral military groupings like the recent ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus, which has 18 member countries including China and the United States, Lt-Gen Ng said the FPDA is still useful.

"The steadiness in which we (the FPDA) pursue our collective interest, the steadfast contributions of assets and commitment over the long period of time, speak volumes."

The defence chiefs spoke to the media on Thursday after the 15th FPDA Defence Chiefs' Conference. During the three-day meeting which ends today, the chiefs also issued a document on developing the grouping's future exercises to beef up cooperation.

From today, men and machines from the five nations will take part in a 14-day exercise, codenamed Bersama Lima, in Penang. The drill will involve 12 ships, 72 aircraft and six ground-based air defence units.

Britain's chief of defence staff, General Sir Nicholas Houghton, told The Straits Times that such drills to build capacity of other countries to prevent conflict is "a smarter way of using militaries".

"This plays to the strengths of the FPDA as bespoke defence arrangement," said Gen Houghton.

"It is useful that it links regional countries to countries from outside the region so that it helps support the stability of the region," he added.

Source:
http://news.asiaone.com/news/sin ... -say-defence-chiefs

robotech

Defence chiefs reaffirm commitment to FPDA


The defence chiefs of the FPDA member-nations meeting in Singapore to convene the 15th FPDA Defence Chiefs Conference which takes place from Wednesday to Friday. (Photo: MINDEF)

The defence chiefs of Singapore, Australia, Britain, Malaysia and New Zealand have reaffirmed their commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).

SINGAPORE: The defence chiefs of Singapore, Australia, Britain, Malaysia and New Zealand have reaffirmed their commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).

The grouping lets member countries cooperate in enhancing regional security and stability.

A Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) statement on Thursday said the defence chiefs met in Singapore this week, and discussed and issued the FPDA Exercise Concept Directive.

The directive guides the development of future FPDA exercises and activities to boost cooperation between the five armed forces in conventional and non-conventional operations.

The 15th FPDA Defence Chiefs Conference (FDCC) takes place from Wednesday to Friday.

Hosted alternately by Singapore and Malaysia, the FDCC is the highest military professional forum of the FPDA.

The statement said the FPDA's ability to evolve and adapt to the changing security environment over the years has enabled it to remain relevant to the needs of its members and become an integral part of the regional security architecture.

This week's meeting is chaired by Singapore's Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant General Ng Chee Meng, and attended by Australia's defence chief General David Hurley, Britain's defence chief General Nicholas Houghton, Malaysia's defence chief General Zulkifeli Mohd Zin and New Zealand's defence chief Lieutenant General Rhys Jones.

The defence chiefs will also attend Exercise Bersama Lima held in Penang, Malaysia, a multilateral drill to boost interoperability among the five countries.

Source:
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/n ... eaffirm/878186.html

robotech

The role of the five power defence arrangements in the Southeast Asian security architecture.

Author:        Emmers, Ralf.
Copyright year:        2010

Abstract:        This paper discusses the evolving Southeast Asian security architecture by focusing on the role of a “mini-lateral” defence coalition, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Examined from the Singaporean and Malaysian points of view, the paper investigates whether the FPDA complements or is being gradually supplanted by other regional security instruments in Southeast Asia. The other mechanisms covered in the paper include the activities undertaken by Malaysia and Singapore with the United States bilaterally, mini-laterally with Indonesia through the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP), and multilaterally through the emerging ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) process. The overall argument of the paper is that for Malaysia and Singapore the FPDA continues to complement these bilateral, mini-lateral and multilateral security instruments, yet each in very different ways. In that sense, the FPDA plays a clear, although limited, role in the Southeast Asian security architecture.

Full article:
http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/6528/WP195.pdf

robotech

Australian Treaty Series 1971 No 21

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CANBERRA


Five Power Defence Arrangements:


Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia regarding External Defence


(Kuala Lumpur, 1 December 1971)


Retrospective entry into force: 1 November 1971


Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Singapore regarding External Defence


(Singapore, 1 December 1971)

Retrospective entry into force: 1 November 1971


AUSTRALIAN TREATY SERIES
1971 No. 21

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra


Full Text:
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1971/21.html

robotech

The Five Power Defence Arrangements:  The Quiet Achiever

Carlyle A. Thayer

The Five Power Defence Arrangements came into force in 1971 as a loose consultative arrangement involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. This article traces the evolution of the FPDA over the past thirty-five years. During this period the FPDA has moved beyond its initial preoccupation with the air defence of peninsula Malaysia and Singapore to area defence. The scope of FPDA exercises has gradually expanded to include combined and joint exercises. In recent years the FPDA has addressed asymmetric threats, maritime security issues and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In sum, the FPDA has become ‘the quiet achiever’ in contributing to regional security.

Full article:
http://www.securitychallenges.or ... s/vol3no1Thayer.pdf

robotech

FPDA masih relevan - Zambellas


Abdul Aziz Jaafar (kiri) bersalaman dengan George Zambellas ketika menerima kunjungan Panglima Tentera Laut United Kingdom itu di Kementerian Pertahanan, Kuala Lumpur, semalam. - BERNAMA

LUMUT 15 Jan. - Perjanjian Pertahanan Lima Negara (FPDA) yang dimeterai sejak empat dekad lalu termasuk Malaysia dilihat masih relevan sehingga ke hari ini.

Panglima Tentera Laut United Kingdom, Admiral Sir George Zambellas berkata, ini kerana perjanjian berkenaan berkisar pada keyakinan dan sokongan seimbang dalam soal keselamatan dan pertahanan yang membantu menyatupadukan negara-negara yang terlibat.

''Perjanjian yang dibuat ini adalah sangat membantu dan saya berpandangan perkara ini patut diteruskan.

''Kami sangat berbangga bekerja bersama-sama dalam tempoh beberapa dekad untuk menyokong perjanjian ini dan berharap lebih banyak boleh dilakukan pada masa depan seperti yang telah dilakukan sebelum ini, selain turut berbangga dengan aset yang dimiliki," katanya kepada pemberita di sini hari ini.

Beliau berkata demikian selepas mengadakan kunjungan hormat ke Pangkalan Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia (TLDM) Lumut dekat sini dengan diiringi Panglima Pemerintahan Armada, Laksamana Madya Datuk Abdul Hadi A. Rashid.

Kerjasama pertahanan dan keselamatan yang menggabungkan lima negara iaitu Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Singapura dan United Kingdom itu telah bermula sejak tahun 1971.

Sementara itu, mengulas tentang lawatannya ke Pangkalan TLDM Lumut, Zambellas berkata, kehadirannya di situ adalah ekspresi terhadap kerjasama antara United Kingdom dengan Malaysia, selain turut didorong oleh hubungan sejarah yang terjalin antara dua buah negara.

''Kehadiran saya ke sini adalah kerana hal ehwal tentera laut yang kita mempunyai hubungan profesional yang panjang termasuk tanggungjawab khusus di bawah FPDA untuk memastikan kita bekerjasama erat bagi menyokong keselamatan serantau," ujarnya.

Dalam lawatan kerjanya selama tiga hari yang berakhir esok, Zambellas yang tiba kira-kira pukul 12 tengah hari telah diberikan kawalan kehormatan sebelum dibawa melawat sekitar pangkalan dan diberi taklimat oleh Abdul Hadi serta dibawa melawat ke KD Panglima Hitam dan KD Duyong.

Di KUALA LUMPUR, Panglima TLDM, Laksamana Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Jaafar menerima kunjungan hormat Zambellas di Wisma Pertahanan.

Abdul Aziz ketika bercakap kepada pemberita memberitahu, pertemuan tersebut memberi impak kepada diplomasi pertahanan negara terutama bagi mempererat dan mempertingkatkan hubungan dua hala serta kerjasama serantau dalam keselamatan maritim.

Beliau berkata, kerjasama itu antaranya dalam aspek pertukaran sumber manusia, bantuan teknikal serta latihan secara lebih pragmatik dan bermanfaat bagi kedua-dua negara.

"Antara yang dibincangkan ialah peluang untuk kita mempelajari secara lebih mendalam tentang perspektif polisi maritim," katanya.

Zambellas juga turut membuat kunjungan hormat ke atas Timbalan Menteri Pertahanan, Datuk Abdul Rahim Bakri.

Artikel Penuh: http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/ ... relevan---Zambellas