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Author: ef/x

Battle of el-Mansourah

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 Author| Post time 9-5-2007 03:47 PM | Show all posts

Reply #20 insignia's post

Gambar cun2, kalau nak share/paste kat sini mmg tak larat gua rase..... aku rekemen pi negok kat sana
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 Author| Post time 9-5-2007 03:51 PM | Show all posts

Egyptian war memorial in sinai




Jangan lupe moral of the story & 'lesson learned'
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Post time 9-5-2007 03:54 PM | Show all posts
The 1973 October War: The Egyptian Perspective



CSC 1997



Subject Area - History



/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Title:   The 1973 October War: The Egyptian Perspective



Author:       Major J.C. Moulton, United States Air Force



Problem Statement: Following the conclusion of the 1967 Six Day War with Israel Egypt was forced to completely re-evaluate its strategic and operational objectives and capabilities. Egypt suffered the loss of over 80 percent of its military capability and was forced to concede control of both the Sinai peninsula and the Suez Canal. Israel also gained control of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Entering the fall of 1973 Egypt's strategic position appeared extremely tenuous. The Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, had failed to achieve the strategic goals of the Arab coalition and his leadership within the Arab world was threatened. Further, the demands of the 1967 Khartoum Conference appeared to eliminate any alternative course of action. The Egyptian leadership faced the dilemma of how to break the deadlock in which it was entangled with Israel without alienating itself from the Arab mainstream. President Sadat, under intense pressure both internally and throughout the Middle East, had to construct a strategic plan in order to engage Israel and recoup the losses of 1967...and survive (politically and literally) long enough to witness the results.



Background. This paper will analyze the changes which the Egyptian leadership made prior to the 1973 October War which enabled it to emerge as the strategic victor. President Anwar Sadat undertook a course which would either place Egypt and Israel on the road to peace or end his career...and probably his life.

Conclusion:    There are several important points to consider:

1.            First, the value of constructive analysis. Egypt critically examined the reasons for the

1967 loss, while Israel failed to properly determine all of the reasons for its success. Egypt then corrected its mistakes and planned accordingly.

2.  The 1973 War demonstrates the value of properly coordinating military capabilities and national objectives. Egypt tailored its desires in order to fall within the grasp of its own military capabilities. It abandoned its unrealistic "total" war outlook (privately) in exchange for a sensible, attainable "limited" approach.

3.  The potential for "shaping" the assumptions and stereotypes of an enemy. Egypt completely fooled the Israelis-a major achievement.

In conclusion, the Egyptian approach to the 1973 October War represents an outstanding case study for any student of military history.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/mi ... rt/1997/Moulton.htm
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Post time 9-5-2007 04:01 PM | Show all posts
good info...

thanks for posting....

as usual the dumbass will deny and make some fool statements...yikhahaha
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Post time 9-5-2007 04:46 PM | Show all posts
Jangan thread ni jadi thread asal October War udah le....
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Post time 9-5-2007 06:09 PM | Show all posts

Reply #19 insignia's post

I somehow find this article less biased and I actually like it more.
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Post time 9-5-2007 06:23 PM | Show all posts
Hmm, since the Egyptian perspective is up, here's the view from the other side. From a Jewish side. Well, obviously it will be biased, as some here may say, but since someone said someone will deny and make a fool statement, well...

In 1971, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat raised the possibility of signing an agreement with Israel, provided that all the occupied territories were returned by the Israelis. No progress toward peace was made, however, so, the following year, Sadat said war was inevitable and he was prepared to sacrifice one million soldiers in the showdown with Israel. His threat did not materialize that year.

Throughout 1972, and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of Resolution 242-total Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in 1967.

Simultaneously, the Egyptian leader carried on a diplomatic offensive among European and African states to win support for his cause. He appealed to the Soviets to bring pressure on the United States and to provide Egypt with more offensive weapons to cross the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union was more interested in maintaining the appearance of detente with the United States than in confrontation in the Middle East; therefore, it rejected Sadat's demands. Sadat's response was to abruptly expel approximately 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt.

In an April 1973 interview, Sadat again warned he would renew the war. But it was the same threat he had made in 1971 and 1972, and most observers remained skeptical.

The War Begins

On October 6, 1973 — Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar — Egypt and Syria opened a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe were mobilized on Israel's borders. On the Golan Heights, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, 436 Israeli defenders were attacked by 80,000 Egyptians.

At least nine Arab states, including four non-Middle Eastern nations, actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort.

A few months before the Yom Kippur War, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions. Iraqi MiGs began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8, the third day of the war.

Besides serving as financial underwriters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus. Also, violating Paris's ban on the transfer of French-made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt (from 1971-1973, President Muammar Qaddafi gave Cairo more than $1 billion in aid to rearm Egypt and to pay the Soviets for weapons delivered).

Other North African countries responded to Arab and Soviet calls to aid the frontline states. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000-2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria.

Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory. Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.

The least enthusiastic participant in the October fighting was probably Jordan's King Hussein, who apparently had been kept uninformed of Egyptian and Syrian war plans. But Hussein did send two of his best units — the 40th and 60th Armored Brigades — to Syria. This force took positions in the southern sector, defending the main Amman-Damascus route and attacking Israeli positions along the Kuneitra-Sassa road on October 16. Three Jordanian artillery batteries also participated in the assault, carried out by nearly 100 tanks.

Israel Recovers

Thrown onto the defensive during the first two days of fighting, Israel mobilized its reserves and eventually repulsed the invaders and carried the war deep into Syria and Egypt. The Arab states were swiftly resupplied by sea and air from the Soviet Union, which rejected U.S. efforts to work toward an immediate ceasefire. As a result, the United States belatedly began its own airlift to Israel. Two weeks later, Egypt was saved from a disastrous defeat by the UN Security Council, which had failed to act while the tide was in the Arabs' favor.

The Soviet Union showed no interest in initiating peacemaking efforts while it looked like the Arabs might win. The same was true for UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. (Waldheim's service with a World War II German army unit guilty of war crimes in the Balkans resulted in his being barred from entering the United States after his election as President of Austria).

On October 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for "all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately." The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it.

Despite the Israel Defense Forces' ultimate success on the battlefield, the war was considered a diplomatic and military failure. A total of 2,688 soldiers were killed.
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Post time 9-5-2007 07:28 PM | Show all posts

Reply #13 mentosonline's post

No, it's not.  Israel can and does lose.  

Convincing its enemies that it is militarily invincible is part of Israel's defence strategy.  But sometimes Israel starts believing its own propaganda and then you get results like leaving the Bar-Lev line undermanned or the latest invasion of Lebanon.

I can understand Israel pursuing this strategy.  But why do you parrot it?

[ Last edited by  awangmamat at 9-5-2007 11:14 PM ]
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Post time 9-5-2007 09:56 PM | Show all posts
Originally posted by <i>insignia</i> at 9-5-2007 03:23 PM<br />

The October War was, without a doubt, the high point of Arab solidarity. A core axis formed by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia was able to mobilise the Arab world as never before. But international and regional conditions have changed, possibly beyond recognition, since 1973, and it is an open question whether the three allies today could muster even a semblance of the Arab solidarity they were able to enlist during the war and in its immediate aftermath.
<br />

Thats what I said, if this isn't Ah Q spirit, what is?
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Post time 10-5-2007 08:13 AM | Show all posts

Reply #28 awangmamat's post

Yes. Which army doesn't lose?
  The IDF have certainly lost many times, but if you compare the losses with the victories of the IDF or the losses of the Arabs, that is something else altogether.
  On 14 October 1973, the Israelis scored one of their best victories of the war. The Egyptians lost an about 150-250 tanks, and the IDF lost 6. Was there any Arabic victory that overshadows this?
And this was done without artillery and air support because the IAF was unreliable at that point in time. Maybe because of the battle of el-Mansourah described before in this thread.

[ Last edited by  mentosonline at 10-5-2007 08:16 AM ]
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 Author| Post time 10-5-2007 09:47 AM | Show all posts
Originally posted by mentosonline at 10-5-2007 08:13 AM
The Egyptians lost an about 150-250 tanks, and the IDF lost 6. . ...


Wow.... care to back up your claim ? source ?
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 Author| Post time 10-5-2007 10:03 AM | Show all posts
Splitting Egypt from the Arab World
Lessons of the October War
By AHMAD FARUQUI

On the 10th of Ramadan (October 6), Egypt and Syria launched Operation Badr against Israeli forces in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. The H-Hour [the hour of attack] began 14:05 with a vigorous attack by the Egyptian and Syrian air forces on Israeli air bases and ground positions. Sixteen days later, on October 22, a UN-sponsored ceasefire took effect.

The Ramadan War (Yom Kippur War as Israeli call it) was similar in duration to the second war between India and Pakistan that began on September 6, 1965. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat had planned his war for 1971 but the onset of the third India-Pakistan war caused him to change his plans. Several lessons can be drawn from what is now called the October War.

The first lesson is that defeat in one war often leads to a new war. Chaim Herzog, a former president of Israel, states that "Israel's brilliant military victory [in 1967] gave rise to a delusion of power on the Israeli side and a deep sense of humiliation on the Arab side." Reflecting this complacency, when asked about the threat posed by the Egyptian air force, the Israeli chief of air staff had asked petulantly, "what Egyptian air force?"

Second, the impact of tactical surprise can be devastating. It acts as a force multiplier, as Israel had shown with its preemptive air strikes in June 1967. It is not always easy to achieve, as Pakistan had discovered on December 3, 1971 when the PAF's air sorties into India failed to achieve any results since the Indians had anticipated them.

To prevent an Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal, Israel had constructed a 110-mile fortification known as the Bar-Lev line along the Canal. It consisted of 26 forts and an enormous continuous sand rampart that rose to a height of 75 feet in places. Like any static fortification, the line proved vulnerable in the end. However, unlike the Maginot line which the Germans outflanked by going through Belgium in the second world war or the Great Wall of China, which Chengez Khan found could be opened easily by bribing the Chinese guards, this one was breached by a remarkable feat of engineering.

At 0400 hours on October 7, Egyptian sappers cut passes in the Bar-Lev line with German water pumps, allowing 500 Egyptian tanks to pour into the Sinai. They had trained in secret for nearly six years in the western desert to develop techniques for creating sixty openings on each side of the Canal. Gradually the Egyptian engineers perfected the operation, enabling them to effect such an opening within five to six hours. Sadat had been prepared to absorb 10,000 deaths in the crossing of the Canal but the success of the sappers allowed him to achieve this objective with only 208 deaths.

Third, success in war is ultimately tied to the accuracy of intelligence estimates about the enemy's capabilities and intentions. In October, 50,000 Egyptian troops were away on Umrah and Israeli intelligence had rated the probability of war breaking out on October 5 as "the lowest of the low." Even Henry Kissinger was duped; he is on record as having stated that "nothing would happen in October." Expecting an attack in May, Gen. David Elazar, the Israeli chief of staff, had ordered a partial mobilisation costing some US$11 million. He wanted to carry out a preemptive strike but was forbidden to do so by then-Israeli prime minister Golda Meir. When the Arab attack did not materialise, the Israeli intelligence was quick to say, I told you so. The vindication of their estimate in May would be a major factor in the mistaken Israeli evaluation in October.

Fourth, a pressed enemy is likely to launch a counter-thrust. Israeli forces led by Maj.-Gen. Ariel Sharon crossed the Canal into Egypt proper on October 15 and within a day were endangering the Egyptian Third Army. However, according to General Saad Al Shazli, the Egyptian chief of staff who later authored "The Arab Military Option," this counter-attack could have been forestalled if Egyptian forces had pressed ahead with their march into Sinai and captured key passes in the Sinai before the arrival of the Israeli reserves. For such bold thinking, he was relieved of command.

Fifth, wars cannot be fought without the right technology. To overcome Israeli advantages in air power and armour, Egypt deployed mobile SAM-6 and SAM-7 missiles and the Sagger and the RPG-7 anti-tank missiles. Indeed, the scale of Israeli tank casualties led some to argue (prematurely) that the tank had been rendered obsolete in modern warfare.

Sixth, third world countries cannot ignore the realities of Great Power politics. To overcome Israeli losses, America flew US$2.2 billion worth of arms and ammunition to Israel aboard its giant C5 Galaxy planes. The airlift brought 22,000 tons of tanks, artillery, helicopters and ammunitions to Israel over a one-month period. Involving more than 560 sorties, it was the biggest such operation since the airlift to Berlin after the end of World War II.

In retaliation, eleven Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia's King Faisal imposed an oil embargo on October 17. They agreed to cut production by five percent from the September level with a pledge to continue cutting five percent a month until their results had been achieved. They also imposed a total ban on oil exports to the US, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia. The embargo reduced oil supplies in the "free world" by nine percent and world trade in oil by fourteen percent. The embargo ended in January 1974 once Egypt and Israel agreed to cessation of hostilities.

Seven, it is best to learn the lessons of war when they are still fresh. Shmuel Agranat, president of the Israeli Supreme Court, headed a Commission to apportion responsibility for the war. When a 40-page extract from the Agranat Commission was released to the public in April, it caused the dual resignations of Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Gen. Elazar was blamed for Israel's early set backs in the war and ordered to resign. He died two years later, a brokenhearted man.

Sadat succeeded in regaining the Sinai but in his anxiety to make peace with Israel, he split Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. When he flew to Israeli-occupied Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 and addressed the Knesset, he alienated himself from many of his own countrymen. As he took the salute at a military parade to commemorate the war on October 6 in 1981, three Egyptian soldiers gunned him down for having failed to liberate Jerusalem.

Ahmad Faruqui is an economist and author of "Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan". He can be reached at faruqui@pacbell.net


http://www.counterpunch.org/faruqui10152003.html
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Post time 10-5-2007 11:17 AM | Show all posts

Reply #15 ef/x's post

Bila aku baca forum irandefence tu, aku suka stail si EAF menghuraikan secara terperinci dgn memberikan link, petikan dari buku2 dan jugak antaranya ada rahsia2 yg kita tak pernah baca. Huraian dia membuat the duboq species kat sana kelam kabut nak putarkan apa2 lagi. Bagus!
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Post time 10-5-2007 11:22 AM | Show all posts

Reply #33 powerwoot's post

hehehe..
itu baru bertukar2 pandangan...
tak semestinya bersetuju dgn pandangan orang lain....

wa pun suka ng stail beberapa forumners kat sana...

:bgrin:
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 Author| Post time 10-5-2007 12:38 PM | Show all posts

Reply #33 powerwoot's post

He did his homework....   academic/quality discussion is better then just trash talking without any facts

[ Last edited by  ef/x at 10-5-2007 12:39 PM ]
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Post time 10-5-2007 01:21 PM | Show all posts

Reply #32 ef/x's post

Perhaps the best outcome from the October/Yom Kippur War was that it enabled the Israelis and Egyptians to put down their weapons and talk peace. Furthermore it resulted in Egypt leaving the Soviet sphere of influence, which furthermore strengthened the peace.
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handell008 This user has been deleted
Post time 10-5-2007 02:45 PM | Show all posts

Reply #30 mentosonline's post

Israel lost about 200 tanks in the Yom Kippur War. The losts were so great, it triggered the Jewish state to develop the Merkava tank.

Israel is not invincible.
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Post time 10-5-2007 06:27 PM | Show all posts

Reply #37 handell008's post

How many tanks did the Egyptians lose btw?

Edit: I went to check. Here are the tank losses for Yom Kippur War for both sides.

Israel: 400 tanks destroyed, another 600 damaged but repaired and restored to service.

Egypt: 2250 tanks destroyed.

[ Last edited by  mentosonline at 10-5-2007 06:29 PM ]
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Post time 10-5-2007 06:33 PM | Show all posts

Reply #37 handell008's post

Actually the Merkava project can be dated back to about the mid 1960s
But yes, the massive tank losses in 1973 heavily influenced the design of the tank to be concentrated on survivability. To bad Singapore couldn't buy it because the 70++ ton weight was too heavy to be used in our terrain here.
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Post time 10-5-2007 09:15 PM | Show all posts
2250 tanks destroyed?! were they wiped out by God?
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